Pakistan is burning

The News Javed Hussain Wednesday, September 18, 2013 From Print Edition It is understandable why the protagonists of continuing the war against insurgency find the decision repugnant. But what is not understandable is why they continue to clamour for war, when, despite ten years of high -intensity combat the army has not been able to extinguish the flames of insurgency that were ignited when the last military ruler sent the army into Fata. Over the years, the flames have engulfed the whole country. Pakistan is burning. The government has to extinguish the flame. Under the circumstances, the decision to employ the political element of national power for this purpose is a wise one. If, however, owing to the insurgents’ intransigent attitude an agreement cannot be reached, the military element can be employed. The intensity of the fighting that has taken place in Fata can be measured by the staggering losses suffered by the state – 5,000 soldiers martyred, thousands more wounded, about 45,000 non-combatants killed and wounded, while the economy has experienced losses close to $100 billion. The question is why, over the years, has the army failed to extinguish the flames it had ignited in Fata? Counterinsurgency operations are a tough undertaking. They become tougher when the geography of the area favours the insurgents, and even more when soldiers are not trained for them. Soldiers are trained for conventional warfare which is the anti-thesis of guerrilla warfare. As a consequence, switching from the conventional to the unconventional is not easy for them. The only elements of the regular army who feel completely at home in guerrilla warfare are the Special Forces. They can switch from commando to guerrilla to anti-guerrilla with ease. But the Special Forces cannot win a war on their own; they can contribute a great deal when used imaginatively and based on sound intelligence. The reason counterinsurgency operations drag on is that when the insurgents come under pressure, they slip out to fight another day, as they did when the army went into Swat and South Waziristan. Since then, they continue to raid security outposts and roadside checkpoints, ambush security convoys, attack lashkars formed by the army of tribal volunteers, carryout a rash of suicide bombings, not only in Fata but the rest of the country as well. In the process they have turned the whole country into a battlefield and created a sense of uncertainty, fear and insecurity in the minds of the people – exacerbated by the audacious attacks on GHQ, Mehran and Kamra bases, ISI offices in Lahore, Multan and Sukkur, jails in Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, and police installations across the country. Although these operations succeeded, perhaps beyond their wildest expectations, the raiders could have inflicted far more damage in their raids on GHQ and Mehran base, which thankfully they didn’t. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of these raids, like the US commando raid in Abbottabad, the security forces were left with egg all over their faces. The insurgents fighting the army have close affinity with the Afghan Taliban, a factor that should be exploited by the government in their talks with them. They not only enjoy the support of the local population, out of fear or conviction, but also have the sympathy of people outside their area including some armed forces personnel. As a result, they have developed an effective intelligence network that enables them to remain a few steps ahead of the army and they are also being supported by external forces. They are battle-hardened and skilled in guerrilla warfare; they know the terrain well and are so highly motivated that they are willing to die even by suicide. The soldiers and their commanders are not skilled in anti-guerrilla warfare, though. They do not know the terrain as well, and generally lack the support of the local people, which makes it difficult for the intelligence services to operate freely in the area. Given their traditional organisation and training, they find it difficult to adapt to the clandestine nature of guerrilla warfare where the enemy is invisible – being here, there, everywhere, yet nowhere, but they still come under surprise attacks in Fata etc. The success or failure of counterinsurgency operations depends on what is perceived as success. Is it the occupation of spaces under insurgents’ control, like Swat and South Waziristan? Or is it the elimination of the insurgents? In a conventional war, occupation of enemy territory constitutes success; in a counterinsurgency war elimination does. Unless the occupation of insurgents’ spaces also leads to their elimination, the army would invariably be drawn into a war without end – of the kind that the Americans fought and lost in Vietnam, the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the Americans in Afghanistan. Can Pakistan afford to fight an endless war? So, if the army is called upon to crush the insurgency, it should plan to achieve this within a year. To do so, it should first establish the right soldier-to-guerrilla ratio on the basis of intelligence about the number of guerrillas present in Fata and their disposition. But since intelligence-gathering is far more difficult in a guerrilla warfare setting, it would be better to err on the side of excess. In the war in Afghanistan the ratio was 10:1 (ten soldiers to one guerrilla). Next, the strategy that is evolved should be characterised by surprise and innovation, and must ensure that the insurgents are unable to escape from the theatre of operation. It is sealing off the theatres to prevent ingress into or exit from it prior to initiating the ‘tightening the noose’ operation that consumes the maximum number of troops. That is why the operations will have to be conducted sequentially. Finally, the army command must ensure that the troops to be employed undergo rigorous training in anti-guerrilla warfare by the SSG before induction. Under-resourced operations rarely succeed. The main constraint on the army is shortage of infantry, which is why some non-infantry units are being employed in infantry role. This constraint will have to be overcome. Fate has placed the destiny of Pakistan in the hands of the army. It is fighting a brutal enemy. The soldiers are fighting with great elan, and dying. History tells us that army commanders tend to fight the next war on the pattern of the last war. In the event, one can say with certainty that the war against the insurgency in Fata will be a war without end. The writer is a retired brigadier